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Abstract  
 
 
Drawing on social comparison theory this study examines the relationship between 
politically connected boards and top executive pay. Moreover, given the socialist 
orientation of China, tests are also carried out to establish the relationship between 
politically connected directors and pay dispersion across the firm. We find a negative 
association between politically connected boards and top executive pay. We also find 
that politically connected boards are negatively associated with pay dispersion, i.e. the 
higher the number of political directors on the board the smaller the gap between top 
executive pay and average employee pay. Finally, our study shows that politically 
connected directors weaken the pay-performance link. These findings have important 
theoretical, policy and managerial implications.  
 
Key words: top executive pay; politically connected directors; China; social comparison 
theory; corporate governance  
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INTRODUCTION   
The question of whether the composition of the board of directors has much impact on 
organizational outcomes is centrally important to a wide array of research agendas in 
strategic management, including studies on executive compensation (Carpenter and 
Sanders, 2002; Conyon, Peck and Sadler, 2001). Accordingly, a body of research has 
been devoted to the question of whether and under what circumstances board 
structure, its composition and other governance factors matter in affecting executive 
compensation (e.g., Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand and Johnson, 1998). However, the 
relation between top executive compensation and board composition has been 
examined in many prior empirical papers with mixed findings (Gomez-Mejia, 1994). 
For example, Lambert, Larcker and Weigelt (1993) document a positive relation 
between CEO compensation and the percentage of the board composed of outside 
directors, whereas Finkelstein and Hambrick (1989) find that compensation is 
unrelated to the percentage of outside directors on the board. 
Drawing on agency theory (Fama and Jensen, 1983), some of these studies 
have explored the relationship between executive compensation and the monitoring 
role of outside directors (Daily, Dalton and Cannella, 2003; Kumar and 
Sivaramakrishnan, 2008). In this respect, Boyd (1994) finds that CEO salaries were 
greater in firms with lower levels of control. Wright, Knoll and Elenkov (2002) find 
that post-acquisition firm size drives CEO compensation in firms with lax monitoring 
but post-acquisition performance drives CEO compensation in vigilantly monitored 
firms. 
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While these prior studies point to the role of outside directors (in general) in 
executive pay determination, little is known about the impact of politically connected 
outside directors on executive compensation despite being more sophisticated and 
successful in gaining board seats (Stern and Westphal, 2010), holding values and 
beliefs consistent with their political ideology1 (Chin, Hambrick and Trevino, 2013) 
and being present in many countries (Agrawal and Koeber, 2001; Faccio, 2006). To 
remedy this omission, we draw on social comparison theory to examine the impact of 
politically connected boards on executive pay in Chinese listed firms. Specifically, we 
investigate whether politically connected boards are associated with lower or higher 
levels of top executive compensation.  
We also test for the effects of political connections on pay dispersion, 
contributing to the literature on pay dispersion that has generally tended to focus on 
the consequences rather than antecedents of pay disparity (e.g., Carpenter and 
Sanders, 2002; Graffin, Wade, Porac and McNamee, 2008). Finally, we take a step 
further and investigate the moderating role of politically connected boards on the 
performance-pay relationship. 
A politically connected board has at least one director who was a former 
politician, including a member of parliament, a minister or any other top appointed 
government bureaucrat or officer in a state-owned enterprise (Faccio, 2006). As such 
politically connected directors may help reduce uncertainty for the firm by connecting 
the firm to the government and influential politicians, bringing information, skills, and 
legitimacy to the firm (Hillman, 2005).  
In this study the institutional context is set in China, in relation to the 
politically connected board’s strategic and governance attitude towards executive pay. 
                                                 
1 Political ideology is normally defined as an interrelated set of attitudes, behaviours and values about the 
goals of society and how they should be achieved. It helps to explain why people do what they do through their 
values and beliefs (Jost, 2006).     
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Chinese boards are characterized by the presence of politically connected directors 
(Buck, Liu and Skovoroda, 2008; Firth, Fung and Rui, 2006). In fact, until recently all 
executive appointments within Chinese firms were made by the state and executive 
pay was calculated according to seniority and civil service formulae that implied 
equality or near-equality between workers and managers (Firth et al., 2006). 
However, following changes to Company Law in 1994, boards of listed firms are 
arguably free to appoint executives and set their own executive pay that, in many 
firms, is limited to basic salary and bonuses (Buck et al., 2008).  
While recent studies have investigated executive pay in China (e.g., Buck et 
al., 2008; Firth, Fung and Rui, 2007; Kato and Long, 2006), none of them have 
explicitly examined the effect of politically connected directors on top executive 
remuneration. Yet, in the case of China, where the economy has achieved spectacular 
growth despite minimum political reform, a deeper understanding of the role played 
by political connections in business is necessary.  
Differing from previous studies, we develop our arguments drawing on social 
comparison theory and the political ideology of outside directors, underscoring the 
salience of the institutional environment in executive pay determination. Here, we 
heed to the call by scholars (e.g., Filatotchev and Allcock, 2010) who have suggested 
that executive pay should be understood within the context of both the organization 
and its surrounding environment.  
Extending prior research on executive pay, our study makes several 
contributions. First, a focus on China is theoretically and empirically important, 
because it allows us to investigate the determinants of executive pay in an under-
explored context. Given the fact that much of the research in executive remuneration 
is western-based, our study helps extend existing research to a rich and complex 
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context beyond that of developed economies, contributing to the literature on 
executive remuneration in general and to pay studies in emerging markets in 
particular. Specifically, findings from this study will provide new insights into how 
special features of the institutional environment, such as political connections, affect 
executive pay, an aspect that has largely been overlooked in the governance literature.  
Second, our study provides an understanding of the effects of directors’ 
ideological background on firm decision making, in general, and on executive 
compensation in particular. While several studies in corporate governance have 
explored specific characteristics of directors and their strategic choices (Carpenter, 
Geletkanycz and Sanders, 2004; Guner, Malmendier and Tate, 2008; Fich and 
Shivdasani, 2006; Hillman, Cannella and Harris, 2002), little is known about 
corporate decision making as a function of directors’ political orientation and 
socialization. Thus, our paper responds to the recent call by Chin et al., (2013) who 
suggest that executives’ political ideologies might be manifested in an array of 
organizational attributes and decisions beyond CSR practices (the subject of their 
focus).  
This represents an important direction, given that political connections are 
rooted in the institutional context of China and have profound implications for firm 
strategies and performance. Examining the relationship between politically connected 
boards and executive pay helps advance our understanding of the governance and 
monitoring role of outside directors in executive pay. Moreover, this study provides 
further evidence to the growing literature on the implications of political connections 
in the business world, in particular on the impact of political connections on top 
executive pay. 
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Third, our study adds to the sparse literature on the determinants of pay 
dispersion within firms. Most prior theorizing and research on executive 
compensation has emphasized the effects of pay differences across firms (e.g., 
Milkovich, Gerhart and Hannon, 1991), thus neglecting the antecedents of pay 
dispersion between top executives and the general employees. Thus, our study 
provides new insights into the antecedents of pay dispersion in the context of China, a 
country with deep-seated socialist traditions, where notions of pay equality or near 
equality have traditionally been emphasized (Firth et al., 2006). 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section presents 
theory and hypotheses. This is followed by the methodology section after which we 
present our results. The penultimate section is on discussion, and we conclude in the 
last one.   
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
Social comparison theory   
A number of studies examining the determination of top executive compensation have 
used a variety of theoretical lenses. Most of this research has been predicated on 
economic theories, including neoclassical notions of marginal product (e.g., Baker, 
Jensen and Murphy, 1988), human capital theory (Hogan and McPheters, 1980), 
transaction cost economics (Ofek and Yermack, 2000), agency theory (Gibbons and 
Murphy, 1992; Tosi, Katz and Gomez-Mejia, 1997), tournament theory (Conyon et 
al., 2001; Main, O’Reilly and Wade, 1993) and managerial power theory (Bebchuk 
and Fried, 2004; Bebchuk, Fried and Walker, 2002).  
Studies based on economic theory are typical attempts to show that CEO 
compensation conforms to some theoretical perspectives, such as agency or 
tournament theory. On the other hand, socio-psychological approaches begin with the 
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premise that the compensation-setting process relies on the deliberations of a small 
group of people who may be affected by a number of psychological and political 
processes that shape individual and group decisions everywhere (Ezzamel and 
Watson, 1998). A study by O’Reilly, Main and Crystal (1988) found that the pay of 
members of the compensation committee, mostly outside directors, was a better 
predictor of top executive pay than were economic factors such as firm performance 
and human capital measures. Thus, the conclusion from this study was that top 
executive pay could be explained in terms of a social comparison process.  
The theory of social comparisons, proposed by Festinger (1954), underlies 
much of the research in equity and organizational justice (Walster, Berscheid and 
Walster, 1973). Research has shown that social comparisons in organizations may 
lead to feelings of inequity (Kulik and Ambrose, 1992; Wade, O’Reilly and Pollock, 
2006), which have in turn been linked to lower productivity at both the organizational 
and individual levels, loss of group cohesion, theft, lower quality and increased 
turnover (Bloom, 1999; Pfeffer and Langton, 1993; Zenger, 1992).  
According to the theory of social comparison processes, social actors and 
decision makers of all kinds have to routinely rely upon a whole range of social 
comparisons to secure equity in the setting up of their expected rewards. Indeed, 
Festinger (1954) noted that individuals have a need to evaluate their opinions and 
abilities. Such an evaluation can be made by comparing oneself against others who 
are perceived to have  abilities similar to one’s own (Fredrickson, Davies-Blake and 
Sanders, 2010). In line with Festinger’s formulation of social comparison theory, 
O’Reilly and colleagues indicated that “when making comparisons, individuals are 
likely to select as comparisons others who are seen as slightly better or more expert” 
(1988: 262).  
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Interpreting these arguments, Ezzamel and Watson (1998) suggest that 
nonexecutive directors are chosen because of their similarity to those who are 
involved in the selection process. They further propose that in setting executive cash 
compensation, members of a compensation committee gather information from their 
own experiences, either as serving executives or as non-executive directors of other 
firms, and the analyses provided by external pay consultants concerning similar 
executives in the most successful comparator firms or in those that provide better-
than-average pay. This has particular implications for both the level of top executive 
remuneration and pay dispersion across the firm. 
Politically connected directors and top executive compensation 
Previous studies have shown the relationship between various forms of outside 
directors and executive compensation. For example, Hallock (1997) shows that CEO 
compensation is higher at firms with interlocked outside directors. Lambert et al. 
(1993) find that CEOs receive higher pay when they have appointed a greater 
proportion of the board. Dalton et al (1998) find no support for the proposition that 
the board compensation committee influences pay levels or the use of performance-
contingent pay, while Deutsch (2005) finds, in a meta-analysis, that the proportion of 
outside directors is generally negatively associated with the use of CEO performance 
contingent pay. Core, Holthausen and Larcker (1999) show that CEO pay decreased 
with the percentage of inside directors, but increased with board size, the percentage 
of outside directors appointed by the CEO, the percentage of gray outside directors2, 
the percentage of outside directors over the age of sixty-nine and the percentage of 
outside directors who serve on three or more boards.  
                                                 
2A gray director is one that is not employed by the firm, but may have some sort of affiliation, which can 
cause a conflict of interest. Ex-employees, CEOs of a partnering firm and the CEOs family members are examples 
of typical gray directors. 
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These studies are part of the broad literature that examines the agency role of 
directors, referring to the governance function in which directors serve shareholders 
by ratifying the decisions of managers and monitoring the implementation of those 
decisions (Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1990; Daily and Dalton, 1997; Fama and Jensen, 
1983). As such the agency role has also been termed the control role of boards 
(Johnson, Daily, Ellstrand, 1996), with a focus on the important monitoring and 
governance function (Daily et al., 2003). Of course, another distinct role that directors 
play is that of providing and securing essential resources for the firm through linkages 
to the external environment (Hillman, 2005; Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; Pfeffer and 
Salancik, 1978). 
While the monitoring and resource provision functions are more likely to be 
straightforward in countries where government intervention in business is kept at a 
minimum (Faccio, 2010), we argue that this may not be the case where the outside 
director is politically connected and particularly if he/she had a former political 
appointment, as is commonly the case in China.  
We argue further that in China, a country with a socialist tradition, the role 
played by politically connected directors in corporate decision making is likely to be 
influenced by their political ideology, reflecting state policies or objectives. Here, the 
politically connected director may play a useful role to the organization, helping the 
firm to gain preferential treatment by state-owned enterprises such as banks (Cull and 
Xu, 2005; Faccio, 2006; Johnson and Mitton, 2003), enabling lighter taxation (De 
Soto, 1989), preferential treatment in competition for government contracts (Dinç, 
2004; Goldman, Rocholl and So, 2008), relaxed regulatory oversight of the company 
in question (Faccio, 2010) and government aid in times of financial trouble (Faccio, 
Masulis and McConnell, 2006). On the other hand, the politically connected director 
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may ensure that the state’s political expectations are met by the firm (Boycko, 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1996; Cull and Xu, 2005; Du and Girma, 2010). 
In the context of executive pay, we argue, therefore, that the presence of 
politically connected directors in Chinese firms may determine the level of executive 
pay in a manner that reflects the political priorities and norms of the state (Mengistae 
and Xu, 2004). Such norms are rooted in the political ideology that emphasizes 
equality of income. Thus, paying high executive compensation can be viewed as 
stretching the boundary and socially unacceptable (Markoczy, Sun, Peng, Shi and 
Ren, 2013).    
First, drawing on social comparison theory, politically connected directors may 
potentially make comparisons between pay in the civil service with that of the 
companies they serve as outside directors. This comparison may be shaped by their 
socialization as well as their experiences as current or former civil servants3. This 
suggests that politically connected directors are likely to recommend pay levels 
similar to those in the civil service, directly reflecting their current or previous 
earnings.  
Social comparison theory argues that individuals routinely compare themselves 
with referent others whom they see as being similar on attributes such as demographic 
characteristics, ability, or position (Festinger, 1954). Indeed, like top executives, 
politically connected directors are likely to be highly motivated, achievement-
oriented, power-seeking, and status-driven (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996). In 
short, top executives as well as politically connected directors have succeeded in 
                                                 
3 Civil servants in China include personnel in Party organizations, the People’s Congresses, the People’s 
Political Consultative Conferences, the judicial and procuratorial organizations (Chan and Li, 2007). This 
effectively makes all politically connected directors former or current civil servants. 
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getting to their respective levels, in part, because they are highly competitive, which 
makes them particularly prone to make social comparisons of pay (Lazear, 1989). 
However, when compared with the private sector, civil service pay in China, 
despite going through several reforms, is lower (Chan and Ma, 2011) and even lower 
for directors of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), from where politically connected 
directors with business expertise are likely to be drawn. This is because before the 
1980s, the Chinese SOE was the lowest link in the chain of command of the central 
planning machinery (Mengistae and Xu, 2004). This was a setting that made the 
enterprise director less of a business executive than a civil servant responsible for the 
implementation of a set of planned targets routinely passed down by a national or 
regional planning hierarchy. The director was thus evaluated and compensated 
accordingly and came under the overseeing authority of the enterprise Communist 
Party Committee, the secretary of which had a greater voice than the director. By 
virtue of being former or current civil servants, politically connected directors share 
this history and socialization, and this experience could potentially influence board 
decision-making processes. Layman (1997) shows that individuals’ values are 
reflected in their political behaviors and decision making processes. Thus, while 
executive compensation in China is generally low by international standards (Buck et 
al., 2008; Conyon and He, 2011; Kato and Long, 2006), by local standards it is likely 
to be lower in firms with higher proportions of politically connected directors.  
Second, high levels of top executive compensation generally are unpopular with 
the public, even in Western economies (Bebchuk and Fried, 2004), as they attract 
attention from the media. In the context of our study, the government may consider 
awarding high levels of compensation to executives as unfair income distribution 
(Markoczy et al., 2013) and thus a red button that potentially triggers public outrage 
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costs (Adithipyangkul, Alon and Zhang, 2011; Firth et al., 2006). Consequently, this 
potential outcry may trigger the intervention of government officials at national level 
and politically connected directors at firm level.  
Having established the motive by politically connected directors in China to 
keep executive compensation at low levels, an important issue to address is their 
capability to influence the pay-setting process. We argue that politically connected 
directors have the power and legitimacy to influence executive compensation because 
they are connected to the state that is dominant and still plays a significant part in 
business (Markoczy et al., 2013). Indeed, the state still controls access to critical 
resources such as raw materials and capital (Keister, 2004). In deciding the level of 
executive compensation Chinese firms are, therefore, influenced by the views of the 
state and those of its ideologically-affiliated actors, such as politically connected 
directors. Given the motive and capability by politically connected directors to 
influence decisions in their favor we suggest:  
Hypothesis 1: There is a negative association between politically connected 
boards and top executive compensation.  
Political connections and pay dispersion 
An area of academic research closely related to the issue discussed above is that of 
pay dispersion in firms. Pay dispersion refers to the amount of difference (inequality) 
in pay created by a firm’s pay structure (Milkovich and Newman, 1999).  
Research has yielded mixed results about what amount of pay dispersion is 
optimal and about its effects in firms. Some researchers draw on tournament theory 
and argue that pay dispersion has positive effects because it promotes competition, 
encouraging top talent to rise to the top (Lazear and Rosen, 1981). Others adopt 
perspectives rooted in social-psychological arguments, such as social comparison 
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theory and suggest that pay dispersion is associated with increased executive turnover 
and decreased firm performance (Bloom and Michel, 2002; Siegel and Hambrick, 
2005).  
While most of these studies have considered the consequences of pay 
dispersion, however, not much is known about its antecedents. Like studies on 
consequences, the limited research on the antecedents of pay dispersion draws on 
social comparison theory, examining teams such as top executives and comparing the 
pay of directors on the same board (e.g., Fredrickson, et al., 2010).  
This paper deviates from previous studies in that rather than examine pay 
differentials among top executives, we consider the set of all company employees 
including top executives as one big team. We consider that beyond the comparison 
that politically connected directors are likely to make between civil service and 
private sector pay, the issue of pay differentials within the firm is another area of 
interest and importance, given the unique institutional context of China.  
Indeed, politically, China is a socialist country that arguably places importance 
on equality (or near equality) of pay between managers and workers (Adithipyangkul 
et al., 2011), a view echoed culturally by a high level of collectivism (Hofstede, 2003) 
and reduced managerial discretion (Crossland and Hambrick, 2011). In fact, the 1956 
civil service pay reform and several others that followed up until 1986 compressed 
occupational differentials in pay (Shi and Wu, 1993).  
We argue that politically connected directors are more likely to push for lower 
pay dispersion in firms. However, the amount of pressure for pay compression 
depends partly on opportunities that politically connected directors have to make 
social comparisons of pay. For example, Leventhal (1976 found that people in groups 
that had a high level of interaction preferred equal rewards. Similarly, Pfeffer and 
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Langton (1988) reported that in public colleges and universities, where compensation 
is a matter of public record, pay was more compressed among both faculty and high-
level administrators, than in private institutions, where such pay information is not in 
the public domain. Politically connected directors in China have both the motive and 
opportunity to make comparisons of different levels of pay. First, they have 
knowledge of civil service pay that is highly compressed due to China’s political 
ideology of equality. Such knowledge comes from their previous experience of civil 
service or their close association with the state. Second, by virtue of having a seat on 
the board they have knowledge of employees’ and top executives’ pay in the firm and 
the opportunity to determine the latter. Thus, making direct comparisons with the 
situation in the civil service, indeed from where they draw their experience, opinions 
and behavior for comparison purposes (Festinger, 1954), politically connected 
directors are likely to influence low executive pay such that the gap between top 
executives’ and company employees’ pay is reduced. We therefore suggest:     
Hypothesis 2: Politically connected boards will be associated with low pay 
dispersion. 
The moderating role of political connections between performance and pay 
A positive relationship between firm performance and top executive compensation is 
consistent with agency theory, the dominant paradigm in this stream of research 
(Jensen and Murphy, 2010; Rost and Osterloh, 2009). Within this framework, 
managers are self-serving and compensation serves as a motivator that aligns the 
interests of managers with those of shareholders (Jensen and Murphy, 2010). In this 
context, the extent to which shareholders’ agency problems are resolved has 
traditionally been assessed by associating executive pay with the performance of the 
firm (Fama and Jensen, 1983).  
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Among many measures of performance, previous studies have used return on 
assets (ROA), return on sales (ROS) and total shareholder return, and the 
responsiveness of pay to performance has been measured by pay-performance 
sensitivity or elasticity (e.g., Buck et al., 2008; Kato and Long, 2006). Table 1 shows 
pay-performance sensitivities and elasticities found in previous studies, for USA, UK, 
Korea and Chinese firms, including the current study. The simple interpretation is that 
the higher the responsiveness, the lower the level of rent-extraction by the agent, thus 
the better the link between performance and  pay (see a footnote to Table 1 for further 
explanation).  
Insert Table 1 near here 
While some authors have documented a strong and positive link between firm 
performance and directors’ pay (e.g., Murphy, 1999; Rost and Osterloh, 2009), other 
studies have not established this relationship (e.g., Bebchuk and Fried, 2004;Tosi, 
Werner, Katz and Gomez-Mejia, 2000). In the context of China, many studies on top 
executive pay have shown a positive association between performance and executive 
compensation (e.g., Buck et al., 2008; Chen, Liu and Li, 2010; Conyon and He, 2011; 
Firth et al., 2007; Kato and Long, 2006; Mengistae and Xu, 2004).  
However, this relationship has not been examined in the presence of political 
connections. Earlier we argued that politically connected boards, consistent with 
social comparison theory, are more likely to keep top executive compensation at 
lower levels, at least in line with civil service remuneration. This suggests that any 
advice or suggestions given by politically connected directors may be a function of 
social processes, failing to embrace the economic or agency theoretic assumption that 
links performance to executive pay. This implies that apart from the direct impact of 
politically connected directors on top executive pay, their presence may also 
 
 
17 
 
indirectly affect the link between performance and top executive pay. As we 
discussed above, politically connected directors are more likely to compare top 
executive pay with that of civil servants based on their own experience and 
socialization.  As discussed earlier too, civil service pay is arguably low and highly 
compressed, with no regard for different levels of individual performance. By 
applying the same formula to executive pay, politically connected directors depart 
from market-based recommendations, potentially obscuring the often assumed 
positive link between firm performance and top executive pay. Put differently, the 
involvement of politically connected directors promotes the norms and values of the 
state for equality of pay, suggesting the possibility of low executive compensation 
even in the face of improved firm performance. We, therefore, suggest that: 
Hypothesis 3: Politically connected boards weaken the link between top 
executive pay and firm performance. 
METHOD   
Data and sample 
To test our hypotheses, we draw our sample from Chinese firms that are listed on the 
Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges. We collected information on top executive 
pay and characteristics of the board of directors from firms’ annual reports for the 
years 2002 through 2008. We chose 2002 as the starting year for two reasons. First, 
the Chinese government put great emphasis on corporate governance, following 
China’s access to the World Trade Organization (WTO) at the end of 2001. Second, 
annual reports for years earlier than 2002 provide less detailed information on the 
characteristics of the board of directors. We focused on firms whose annual reports 
can be obtained from Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges, the website of the 
China Security Regulation Committee (CSRC), and the websites of listed firms for 
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the six years from 2002 to 2008. Our sample consists of 964 listed firms and the 
majority of them were in the manufacturing sector. We excluded firms in the financial 
sector because financial firms have different financial structures, disclosure regimes 
and ways of measuring their performance. Moreover, the financial sector is heavily 
regulated by the Chinese government, making it difficult to examine the role of 
political connections in the context of such a regulated sector.  
Dependent variables  
We use two dependent variables: top executive cash pay (TE Cash pay) and pay 
dispersion. Top executive pay was measured by salaries and bonuses and was 
calculated as the logarithm of average cash pay for the three highest-paid executives 
at 2000 prices. To capture the pay dispersion in a firm we followed Bloom (1999) by 
using the ratio of the average employee’s pay to the average of top three executive 
pay. Thus, a lower ratio indicates greater pay dispersion between workers and top 
executives.  
Independent variables  
Political connections  
In order to evaluate the impact of politically connected boards, we focus on outside 
directors who have had a political background. We define an outside director with 
political connections as one who was formerly a government officer or member of the 
Chinese People’s Congress (CPC) or the Chinese People’s Political Consultative 
Conference (CPPCC) at county and above levels. We identify whether an outside 
director was a government official before joining the listed firm from the “Profile of 
Directors and Senior Managers” section of the company’s annual reports. The 
political connections were measured as a ratio of outside directors who were formerly 
government officials to the total number of board directors. 
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Firm performance 
Return on sales (ROS) is used to measure firm performance. This variable is included 
in our estimation equations in order to test the moderating effect of political 
connections on the relationship between executive pay and firm performance. 
Control variables 
Given that state-owned enterprises enjoy preferential status in obtaining loans and 
other key inputs (Brandt and Li, 2003; Che, 2002), we control for state ownership. 
State shareholding, is calculated as the percentage of shares owned by the central 
government, local governments and government related agencies. We follow the 
methodology by Delios, Wu, and Zhou (2006) to categorize ownership in Chinese 
listed firms according to the ultimate identity of shareholders. We also include foreign 
shareholding to control for the influence of foreign investors. We control for the 
impact of board directors by including board size in our estimations that is measured 
as the total number of board directors. We also include top executive equity 
ownership, calculated as the percentage of total equity owned by top executives in a 
firm. We control for firm size and firm age since larger and older firms may pay more 
for top executives. Firm size and firm age are measured by the logarithm of firm total 
assets and the number of years since establishment respectively. We include debt-
equity ratio to control for slack resources. We also control for cross listing. Based on 
information on whether firms have listed outside mainland China, from the 
company’s annual reports, we created a dummy variable which takes the value of one 
if firms have been cross listed in international exchanges, and zero otherwise. We also 
control for the average age of top executives and CEO change. We used industry 
dummies to control for industry effects and year dummies to control for time varying 
effects. 
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Method of analysis  
Before testing our hypotheses, we first consider sample selection bias by testing 
which types of firms are likely to have politically connected directors. In order to test 
for sample selection bias, we created a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if a 
firm has a politically connected outside director and 0 otherwise. We estimated a 
binary logit model to check what types of firms are likely to have politically 
connected directors. For the explanatory variables, we included firm size, age, state 
shareholdings, foreign shareholdings, cross listing, industry dummies and a year 
dummy, when the government required that one third of board directors should be 
outside directors. 
To test whether politically connected directors directly influence top executive 
pay (H1) and indirectly affect the link between executive pay and performance (H3), 
we take account of the possibility of a two-way causality between performance and 
top executive compensation. On one hand, firm performance may affect the level of 
executive remuneration, an observation that has been made in the literature (Kato and 
Long, 2006). On the other hand, executive pay may create motivational incentives 
which help to enhance firm performance (Buck et al., 2008). If reverse causation 
exists, the impact of firm performance on executive pay would be overstated when 
using OLS with the fixed effects model. In such a situation, the generalized method of 
moments (GMM) should be applied to take the interconnectedness of top executive 
pay and firm performance into account. GMM is widely used to deal with the 
endogeneity problem in panel data analysis as this method is sufficiently flexible to 
control for unobserved heterogeneity and endogeneity. In particular, Blundell and 
Bond (1998) suggest that GMM estimation is an appropriate approach to short panel 
data as it allows for a large set of instruments of both lagged levels and first 
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differences and, therefore, exploits fully all of the available moment conditions. This 
yields better predictions for the endogenous explanatory variables in the finite sample. 
We adopt this approach to test our hypotheses. 
To test hypothesis 2 which predicts that pay dispersion will decrease as 
political connections increase, we follow Papke and Wooldridge (1996) by first 
performing a logit transformation on pay dispersion in order to map the ratio to the 
whole scale. This is explained by the equation: PD=ln(Pay Dispersion/(1-Pay 
Dispersion),  where PD is the ratio variable with a value between 0 and 1. We thus 
use the transformed PD variable as the dependent variable in the pay dispersion 
model.  
RESULTS 
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics and the correlation matrix for the study variables. 
The correlations among independent variables are very low. According to our data, 
the average board size is 9. State share holdings account for 32% of the ownership of 
the sample firms, whereas 6% of the sample firms are cross-listed.  
Insert Table 2 near here 
The results of sample selection bias test presented in Table 3 show that the 
variables relating to firm characteristics are insignificant These results show that the 
variable for political connections is weakly exogenous to firm characteristics. Hence, 
sample section bias is not a concern in our study.    
 
Insert Table 3 near here 
 
The endogeneity test reveals two-way causality between executive pay and 
firm performance (Hausman test = 80.318, p<0.001), suggesting that executive pay 
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and performance mutually affect each other (Buck et al., 2008; Kato and Long, 2006). 
The significant reverse causation indicates that there is also feedback from pay to 
performance and should be taken into account in modelling the link between 
executive pay and performance. Based on the results from causality tests, we estimate 
the direct and indirect impact of political connections on top executive pay by 
applying GMM to take two-way causality into account. We used lagged variables as 
instruments that are commonly used to address the endogeneity problem in GMM 
estimation (Baum, Schaffer and Stillman, 2003). The consistency of the GMM 
estimator depends on the validity of the instrumental variables used in the regression. 
We conducted the Sargan test to verify whether the instrumental variables are 
uncorrelated to residuals and whether they are acceptable instruments. The 
insignificant results from the Sargan test in Table 4 indicate that the instrumental 
variables are appropriate. 
The results obtained from GMM estimations are shown in Table 4. In Model 1 
the main effects of the independent variables were estimated with top executive pay 
as the dependent variable and the proportion of political connected directors and firm 
performance as independent variables in the pay equation. The interaction term 
between political connections and firm performance was included in Model 2.   
Insert Table 4 near here 
Hypothesis 1 posits that there is a negative association between politically 
connected boards and top executive compensation. Results in Models 1and 2 in Table 
4 indicate that the variable of political connections is significant and negatively 
associated with executive remuneration  at (β=-0.361, p<0.01) in Model 1 and at (β=-
0.257, p<0.1) in Model 2. Hypothesis 1 is, therefore, supported.  
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Hypothesis 2 predicts that politically connected boards will be positively 
associated with low pay dispersion. The results presented in Table 5 show that the 
coefficient for political connections is statistically significant and positively 
associated with a low level of pay dispersion(β=0.528, p<0.05), suggesting that 
politically connected directors favor a smaller pay gap between workers and 
executives. Thus, we found empirical evidence that supports Hypothesis 2.  
Insert Table 5 near here 
From the control variables, state shareholding and CEO change have the 
similar effect as the political connection variable. Firm performance, foreign 
shareholding, cross listing, board size, debt-equity ratio, firm age and firm size are 
negatively associated with the pay dispersion, indicating that these factors contribute 
to a larger pay gap.  
Hypothesis 3 predicts that politically connected boards weaken the impact of 
firm performance on executive pay. To test this hypothesis, we add interactive 
variables-political connections and firm performance in Model 2 in Table 4. The 
individual coefficients of political connections and firm performance now represent 
conditional rather than additive effects, and hence their respective coefficients diverge 
from those in previous models (Friedrich, 1982). In Model 2, the inclusion of the 
interaction term improves the model 2R  from 0.242 to 0.266. Model 2 shows support 
for the conditional impact of firm performance on executive pay. In the absence of 
political connections (i.e. when political connections equal 0), the effect of 
performance on executive pay is positive and significant (β=0.453; p<0.01). However, 
in the aftermath of introducing politically connected directors the effect of 
performance on pay is reduced, as shown by a negative and significant coefficient 
(β=-2.938; p<0.05).When the proportion of politically connected directors equal 0.039 
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(the average), the conditional impact of firm performance on executive pay is [0.453-
2.938*(0.039) =0.338; s.e. =0.115; p<0.05]. This suggests that when the proportion of 
political connections increases to 0.039, top executive pay is reduced by 40.2 percent 
[100(exp(0.338)-1)]. Based on these results, Hypothesis 3 is supported.  
For the purpose of determining the range of political connections over which 
the effect of performance on executive pay is significantly reduced, we follow the 
guidelines by Brambor, Clark and Golder (2006) and thus plot the marginal effect of 
performance on executive pay on the condition of political connections (Figure 1). 
When both upper and lower 95% confidence interval lines (broken lines) are above or 
below the zero line, firm performance has a statistically significant effect on executive 
pay. The lower 95% confidence interval line crossed the zero line when the rate of 
politically connected directors equals 0.127 under which the conditional impact of 
firm performance on executive pay is [0.453-2.938*(0.127) =0.080; s.e. =0.040; 
p<0.05]. Therefore, when political connections are between 0 and 0.127, performance 
has a statistically significant effect on executive pay. When the proportion of political 
connected directors is above 0.127, the marginal effect of performance on pay 
becomes insignificant. The graphical display in Figure 2 shows the main effect of 
political connections and performance on top executive pay and the interaction term 
between the two. It clearly shows that political connections weaken the positive link 
between firm performance and executive pay. Executive pay is reduced when political 
connections increase, given the same level of firm performance.   
Insert Figures 1 and 2 near here 
Robustness tests 
In Hypothesis 2 we proposed that politically connected boards reduce pay dispersion. 
We found support for this hypothesis. However, when this result is considered 
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alongside the finding in Hypothesis 1, that political connections reduce executive pay, 
it may be possible that pay dispersion decreases primarily because of the lowering of 
executive pay. It is also possible that reduced pay dispersion could be due to political 
directors influencing an increase in employees’ pay. To be certain about the effect of 
political connections on pay dispersion, we carried out further tests. We ran regression 
tests with average pay as a dependent variable. The results in Table 5 show that 
political connections do not have a significant effect on average employee pay 
(β=0.004, insignificant). This suggests that the reduction in the pay gap is mainly due 
to the negative association between political connections and executive pay.   
For all the hypotheses, we reran our regression tests using an alternative 
measure of performance-return on assets (ROA). Overall, the results are substantively 
similar to our primary results, pointing to their robustness4. 
DISCUSSION  
At a broader level, this study relates to two main strands of the literature: the first 
studies the relationship between politics and business and the second studies how 
board attributes and director characteristics affect the firm in important decisions such 
as executive compensation. At a specific level, this paper examines the behavior of 
politically connected directors, as influenced by their political ideology, on decisions 
related to top executive compensation, pay dispersion within the firm and the 
performance-pay link.    
After controlling for other characteristics of the sample firms, we find that 
firms with politically connected outside directors grant a lower level of top executive 
compensation. In the context of China, this may suggest that firms with politically 
connected boards would avoid payment of large executive compensation possibly for 
                                                 
4 For the sake of parsimony these results are available upon request 
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the purpose of social harmony. Politically connected directors may help adhere to the 
political goal of achieving a harmonious society set up by the Chinese government as 
the top priority (Zhang and Liu, 2009). This may explain why there is a negative 
association between politically connected directors and top executive pay. It is 
plausible therefore, that aligning the interests of management and those of 
shareholders is not the priority for politically connected boards. Our findings possibly 
suggest that politically connected directors, who are embedded in the Chinese 
institutional context, are more likely to act as an intermediary by reinforcing 
government expectations with regard to executive remunerations. Our findings also 
provide a more complete picture about the impact of the unique characteristic of 
board directors in China.  
We have also found evidence which shows that there is a negative association 
between politically connected outside directors and pay dispersion. Our findings 
imply that a low pay dispersion is rooted both in the institutional context that places 
great emphasis on the equality of pay between managers and workers and the long 
held values of board directors who help to enhance such equality.   
We go a step further to examine how the presence of politically connected 
directors affects the link between top executive pay and firm performance. We found 
that politically connected directors do not only affect top executive pay directly, but 
also indirectly impact the link between executive compensation and firm 
performance. These results support our overall line of argument that the corporate 
decisions made by politically connected directors in China are subject to social 
comparison processes and reflect communist values of equality. Given, therefore, the 
political ideology of politically connected directors, our findings are justifiably 
explained through the lens of social comparison and move beyond an agency 
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theoretical perspective that rationalizes the positive association between executive pay 
and performance.       
This paper claims a number of contributions to the field of corporate 
governance. Broadly, our paper contributes to the stream of research on the 
determinants of top executive compensation. It does this by improving our 
understanding of an important but understudied type of outside directors, namely 
former or current politicians/government officials, in determining top executive 
compensation and pay dispersion. Specifically, it contributes to the literature on 
political intervention in corporate governance in general and top executive 
compensation in particular. 
Moreover, our study adds to the literature on corporate governance by 
suggesting that outside directors who share the norms and values of the state are more 
likely to promote the interests and ideology of the latter.   
In addition, our paper contributes to better understanding and further 
application of social comparison theory in two important ways. First, we apply social 
comparison theory to understand pay dispersion across the firm beyond top 
management teams (TMTs), thus broadening previous studies in this area. Such an 
extension enriches our understanding of how the political ideology of board directors 
affects pay dispersion in the context with socialist traditions, indeed where ‘the setting 
of executive compensation has several unique attributes that support a social 
explanation’ (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996: 275).  
Second, in contrast to previous studies that have demonstrated the potential 
increase of remuneration following social comparison processes (Fredrickson et al., 
2010), our study shows that the same processes could be used resulting in lower levels 
of top executive remuneration.  
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Our findings have important theoretical implications for the role of outside 
directors in different institutional contexts with different levels of government 
intervention. Moreover, our findings carry some policy and managerial implications. 
The results from the study suggest that politically connected outside directors have 
played dual roles in helping firms gain key resources and reinforce government 
expectations with regard to top executive pay and pay dispersion. Hence, appointing 
former government officials as outside directors may help firms gain legitimacy and 
promote social harmony by designing acceptable executive compensation.  
Limitations and future research 
Like all research, this study is not exempt from limitations. First, our use of secondary 
data on issues of social comparison carries inherent limitations. Like all empirical 
studies on executive compensation that assume board involvement but rely on 
archival data (e.g., Oreilly et al., 1988), we did not assess the actual process by which 
the board sets executives’ pay. Thus, even though previous research indicates that 
social-psychological processes that influence pay allocation at lower levels generalize 
well to board members (Fredrickson et al., 2010; Westphal and Zajac, 1995, 1997) we 
do not know how the issue of social comparisons is invoked in the process of 
determining top executive pay, particularly where politics and business are mutually 
important. Here, the way forward should be to employ more grounded approaches of 
data collection such as the use of interviews.  
Second, while we have based our arguments on the uniqueness of the 
institutional environment, China’s approach to business is fast changing. While 
arguments on path dependence may suggest that continuity is likely to win over 
radical change, the notion of equality within the Chinese society is facing great 
challenges from the forces of globalization, and is likely to fade with time. It would 
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be interesting to see whether after a number of years Chinese firms continue to use 
politically connected directors or not, or whether such politically connected directors 
continue to hold and apply current political ideology on executive compensation and  
other corporate decisions.  
Third, our measure of political connections is limited, and the nature of our 
data does not have a fine-grained distinction of who is on the board except for 
politically connected directors. Future research can develop a more fine grained 
analysis of the more detailed characteristics of the board of directors. 
Finally, only aggregate salary and bonuses for the three highest paid 
executives are disclosed by Chinese listed firms, and using average top-three 
executive pay in our estimation may lack variation relative to individual pay. 
Moreover, our data on top executive compensation does not include long-term forms 
of pay such as stock options. However, as a practical matter, stock options have not 
been a common component of top executive pay in China. Relatedly, the use of the 
committee system, similar to other Asian countries (Chizema and Shinozawa, 2012), 
is still in its infancy in China. It is therefore difficult to find out who actually is 
involved with the duties of a compensation committee in many firms. With changes 
taking place in the governance of firms in China, accompanied by greater corporate 
disclosure and possible widespread use of board committees, future studies could 
examine the effect of outside directors on the various components of individual top 
executive compensation. 
Conclusions 
Using a unique dataset of Chinese listed firms, we provide new conceptual and 
empirical insights into the determinants of top executive pay. Drawing on social 
comparison theory, this is one of the first studies to examine the impact of political 
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connections on top executive compensation and firm pay dispersion in the context of 
a large emerging economy. We have found that top executive pay and pay dispersion 
are negatively affected by politically connected outsider directors. Political 
connections weaken the relationship between performance and pay in an institutional 
context with socialist traditions.  
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Table 1: Estimates of median executive pay sensitivities5 and elasticities6 compared (salary and bonus only) 
Researcher(s) 
(date) 
Country 
(Years studied) 
Performance→ 
Pay Sensitivity 
Performance→ 
Pay Elasticity 
Pay→Performance 
Elasticity  
Hall and 
Liebman (1998)  
USA 
(1980-1994) 
- 0.22 - 
Benito & 
Conyon (1999)  
UK 
(1990-1996) 
- 0.26 - 
Kato, Kim and 
Lee (2005) 
S. Korea - 0.194 - 
Firth, Fung, and 
Rui (2006) 
China 
(1998-2000) 
0.021 (insig.) - - 
Kato and Long 
(2006)  
China 
(1998-2002) 
0.053  0.369 - 
Buck, Liu and 
Skovoroda 
(2008)  
China 
(2000-2003) 
0.027** 
(3.44) 
0.250* 
(2.71) 
0.015*  
(2.49) 
Current study 
(2013) 
China  
(2002-2008) 
 0.271*** 
(3.61) 
0.036* 
(2.27) 
 
*, **, and *** represent significance at the 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 levels, respectively. 
                                                 
5  Performance-pay sensitivity shows the absolute increment to pay associated with a 1000 unit (e.g., $) increase in shareholder value: so a sensitivity of 
0.053 (for China; Kato and Long, 2006) indicates that an additional $1000 of shareholder value is associated with 5.3 cents of additional executive pay. It is calculated by 
regressing changes in executive pay on changes in shareholder value. 
 
6 Performance-pay elasticity shows the percentage responsiveness of pay to a percentage change in performance. For example, an elasticity of 0.10 denotes that a CEO 
associated with a 20% rate of return would be paid 1% more than a CEO associated with 10% (Hall and Liebman, 1998: 654). It is calculated by regressing the change in the 
log of executive pay on change in the log of shareholder value. 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix  
 
 Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1 TE cash pay 12.04 0.84 9.16 15.36                
2 Pay 
dispersion 
-1.62 1.41 -6.33 5.32 -0.386               
3Performance 0.03 0.44 -7.09 12.76 0.124 -0.028              
4 Political 
connection 
0.04 0.08 0.00 0.43 0.026 0.023 0.001             
5 Board size 9.07 1.97 4.00 20.00 0.183 -0.055 0.049 -0.004            
6 Average age 
of TE 
46.61 3.25 36.00 59.00 0.187 -0.019 0.053 0.136 0.171           
7 CEO change 0.31 0.46 0.00 1.00 -0.106 0.048 -0.076 0.005 0.009 -0.113          
8 State share 
holding 
0.32 0.24 0.00 0.97 -0.087 0.091 0.029 0.038 0.185 0.218 0.009         
9 Foreign share 
holding 
0.01 0.05 0.00 0.64 0.097 -0.082 -0.014 0.003 0.005 0.042 0.029 -0.106        
10 Cross listing 0.06 0.24 0.00 1.00 0.137 -0.083 -0.008 -0.004 0.049 0.039 0.007 -0.093 0.783       
11 TE equity 
ownership 
0.003 0.03 0.00 0.75 0.053 -0.013 0.011 -0.016 -0.055 -0.043 -0.042 -0.119 -0.013 -0.001      
12 Debt-equity 
ratio 
0.56 0.76 0.01 43.08 -0.027 -0.010 -0.064 0.028 -0.032 -0.016 0.041 -0.047 0.004 0.007 -0.024     
13 Firm size 9.27 0.45 6.76 11.88 0.395 -0.113 0.139 0.062 0.272 0.304 -0.089 0.148 0.042 0.057 -0.050 -0.120    
14 Firm age 10.75 4.41 2.00 50.00 0.191 -0.090 -0.018 0.011 -0.066 0.046 0.041 -0.333 0.023 -0.002 -0.062 0.088 -0.026   
15 Average Pay 10.09 1.04 7.32 13.67 0.408 0.654 0.073 0.040 0.094 0.126 -0.032 0.023 -0.006 0.026 0.031 -0.034 0.201 0.046  
Notes: 1. All correlation coefficients more than 0.033 or less than –0.033 are significant at the 5% level or higher. 
           2. TE denotes top executive. 
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Table 3: Determinants of politically connected outside directors  
DV: Political connections (binary logit model) 
 Coefficients Std. Error 
Cross listing  -0.573 0.545 
State share holding  0.246 0.344 
Foreign share 
holding  
1.577 2.303 
Debt-equity ratio 6.522 4.713 
Firm size  1.728 1.157 
Firm age -0.072 0.054 
Year dummy  0.394 0.455 
Industry dummies   Included  Included  
Observations    5111  
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Table 4: Results from testing top executive pay 
DV: TE cash pay Model 1 
 
Model 2 
 
  
 
GMM   GMM  
Political connections (PC) -0.361** 
(0.129) 
-0.257† 
(0.135) 
Performance(-1) 0.528*** 
(0.050) 
0.453** 
(0.169) 
PC X Performance(-1)  
 
-2.938* 
(1.442) 
Cross listing 0.358*** 
(0.063) 
0.352*** 
(0.062) 
State share holding -0.188*** 
(0.047) 
-0.203*** 
(0.046) 
Foreign shareholding -0.075 
(0.293) 
-0.113 
(0.289) 
Board size  0.043*** 
(0.005) 
0.044*** 
(0.005) 
Average age of TE 0.009** 
(0.003) 
0.010** 
(0.003) 
CEO change  -0.119*** 
(0.021) 
-0.121*** 
(0.021) 
Debt-equity ratio  0.027* 
(0.012) 
0.019 
(0.013) 
Firm size  0.526*** 
(0.025) 
0.550*** 
(0.027) 
Firm age  0.016*** 
(0.003) 
0.016*** 
(0.003) 
TE equity ownership 1.570*** 
(0.311) 
1.587*** 
(0.308) 
Industry dummies Included Included 
Year Dummies Included Included 
R^2 0.242 0.266 
Observations 5111 5111 
Sargan statistic 1.095 
p-value= 0.579 
5.192 
p-value= 0.158 
Note: †, *, **, and *** represent significance at the 0.1, 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 levels, respectively.  
Standard errors in parentheses 
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Table 5: Results from testing pay dispersion      
 
 DV: Pay dispersion 
 
OLS 
DV: Average pay 
 
OLS  
Political connections   0.528* 
(0.240) 
0.004 
(0.176) 
Performance(-1)  -0.094† 
(0.050) 
0.099** 
(0.036) 
Cross listing  -0.218† 
(0.118) 
0.177* 
(0.086) 
State shareholding  0.393*** 
(0.087) 
0.106† 
(0.064) 
Foreign shareholding 
  
-1.085* 
(0.545) 
-0.920** 
(0.400) 
Board size  -0.028** 
(0.010) 
0.023*** 
(0.007) 
Average age of TE  0.004 
(0.006) 
0.013** 
(0.005) 
CEO change  0.182*** 
(0.040) 
0.013 
(0.029) 
Debt-equity ratio -0.038† 
(0.023) 
-0.020 
(0.017) 
Firm size  -0.341*** 
(0.046) 
0.297*** 
(0.034) 
Firm age  -0.025*** 
(0.005) 
-0.008* 
(0.004) 
TE equity ownership -0.205 
(0.579) 
1.469*** 
(0.425) 
Industry dummies  Included Included 
Year dummies Included Included 
R^2  0.048 0.091 
Observations  5111 5111 
Note: †, *, **, and *** represent significance at the 0.1, 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 levels, respectively.  
Standard errors in parentheses 
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Figure 1:  The moderating effect of political connections on the link between top 
executive pay and firm performance    
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: The combined effect of political connections and firm performance on top 
executive pay  
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